Publications: By Topic

Complexity of Equilibria

• “Settling the Complexity of Nash Equilibrium in Congestion Games“, joint with Aviad Rubinstein. In STOC ’21.
• “Communication complexity of Nash equilibrium in potential games“, joint with Aviad Rubinstein. In FOCS ’20.
• “The Communication Complexity of Local Search“, joint with Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan. In STOC ’19.
• “Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players“, joint with Itai Arieli. In EC’ 2017.
• “Communication Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria”, joint with Aviad Rubinstein. In STOC`2017. and in GEB Special Issue for best AGT papers from STOC/FOCS/SODA 2016-2017. Covered in press by the Quanta Magazine. Won the Prize in Game Theory and Computer Science in Honour of Ehud Kalai.
• “Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy? PCP for PPAD and the Inapproximability of Nash“, joint with Christos Papadimitriou, and Aviad Rubinstein. In ITCS’2016.
• “Query Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria”. Conerence version: In STOC’2014. Journal version: JACM, 63.4 (2016): 36.
• “Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium”, joint with Siddharth Barman. TEAC 3.4 (2015): 22.
• “Empirical Distribution of Equilibrium Play and Its Testing Application”, joint with Siddharth Barman and Ron Peretz. Conference version: In EC’2014. Journal version: MOR (2016), forthcoming.

Information Aggregation and Information Design

• “Sequential Naive Learning“, joint with Itai Arieli and Manuel Mueller-Frank. In EC ’21.
• “Regret Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion”, joint with Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, and Konstantin Zabarniy. In EC ’21.
• “Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs“, joint with Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, and Omer Tamuz. In EC ’20. Best paper award.
  
• “Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling“, joint with Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky, and Takuro Yamashita. In EC ’20.
• “Learning Optimal Forecast Aggregation in Partial Evidence Environments“, joint with Dan Garber. MOR forthcoming.
• “Identifiable Information Structures“, joint with Itai Arieli nad Rann Smorodinsky. GEB, 120, 16-27 (2020).
• “Private Bayesian Persuasion”, joint with Itai Arieli. JET, 182, 185-217 (2019).
• “Naive Learning Through Probability Matching“, joint with Itai Arieli and Manuel Mueller-Frank. In EC ’19.
• “Robust Non-Bayesian Learning”, joint with Itai Arieli and Segev Shlomov. In EC ’19.
• “Robust Forecast Aggregtion“, joint with Itai Areili and Rann Smorodinsky. PNAS, (2018).
• “Computational Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion”, joint with Siddharth Barman. In ITCS’2017.

Implementing Pareto Efficiency in Strategic Interactions

• “Sequencial Commitment”, joint with Itai Arieli and Moshe Tennenholtz. GEB, 105 (2017), 297-315.
• “Pareto Efficient Implementation by Approval Voting”, joint with Leonard Schulman.
• “Random Extensive Form Games”, joint with Itai Arieli. JET, 166 (2016), 517-535.
• “Average-Testing and Pareto Efficiency”, joint with Itai Arieli. JET, 147 (2012), 2376-2398.

Learning in Games

• “Communication complexity of Nash equilibrium in potential games“, joint with Aviad Rubinstein. In FOCS ’20.
• “The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks“, joint with Itai Arieli, Ron Peretz and Payton Young. Econometrica, 88, 569-594 (2020).
• “The Communication Complexity of Local Search“, joint with Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan. In STOC ’19.
• “Communication Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria”, joint with Aviad Rubinstein. In STOC`2017. and in GEB Special Issue for best AGT papers from STOC/FOCS/SODA 2016-2017. Covered in press by the Quanta Magazine. Won the Prize in Game Theory and Computer Science in Honour of Ehud Kalai.
• “Best-Reply Dynamics in Large Aggregative Games”, MOR, 43 (2018), 333-346.
• “Query Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria”. 2014. Conerence version: In STOC’14. Journal version: JACM, 63.4 (2016): 36.
• “How Long to Pareto Efficiency?”. IJGT, 43 (2014), 13-24.
• “Best-Reply Dynamics in Large Binary-Choice Anonymous Games”. GEB, 81 (2013), 130-144.
• “Average-Testing and Pareto Efficiency”, joint with Itai Arieli. JET, 147 (2012), 2376-2398.
• “Completely Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibria”. GEB, 76 (2012), 1-14.
• “Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria”. IJGT, 39 (2010), 483-502.

Voting and other Selection Mechanisms

• “Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests”, joint with Oren Dean and Moshe Tennenholtz. In EC ’20.
• “Incentive-Compatible Classification“, joint with Oren Dean and Moshe Tennenholtz. In AAAI ’20.
• “Incentive Compatible Diffusion“, joint with Oren Dean and Moshe Tennenholtz. In WWW ’18.
• “Pareto Efficient Implementation by Approval Voting”, joint with Leonard Schulman.

Fundamental Game Theory

• “Graphical Potential Games”, joint with Omer Tamuz. JET, 163 (2016), 889-899.
• “Axiomatic Approach to Solutions of Games”.

Other Fun Puzzles

• “Stable Secretaries“, joint with Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, and Rann Smorodinsky. Conference version: In EC’ 2017. Journal version: Algorithmica (2019).
• “Random Extensive Form Games”, joint with Itai Arieli. JET, 166 (2016), 517-535.
• “Hunter, Cauchy Rabbit, and Optimal Kakeya Sets”, joint with Yuval Peres, Ron Peretz, Perla Sousi, and Peter Winkler. Transtactions of AMS (2014), 366, 5567-5586.
• “Musical Chairs”, joint with Yehuda Afek, Uriel Feige, Eli Gafni, Nati Linial, and Benny Sudakov. Conference verion: DC’2011. Journal version: SIDMA 28.3 (2014), 1578-1600.