Publications: Chronological

Sequential Naive Learning“, joint with Itai Arieli and Manuel Mueller-Frank. In EC ’21.

“Regret Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion”, joint with Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, and Konstantin Zabarniy. In EC ’21.

Settling the Complexity of Nash Equilibrium in Congestion Games“, joint with Aviad Rubinstein. In STOC ’21.

Communication complexity of Nash equilibrium in potential games“, joint with Aviad Rubinstein. In FOCS ’20.

Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs“, joint with Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, and Omer Tamuz. In EC ’20. Best paper award.

Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling“, joint with Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky, and Takuro Yamashita. In EC ’20.

“Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests”, joint with Oren Dean and Moshe Tennenholtz. In EC ’20.

“Learning Optimal Forecast Aggregation in Partial Evidence Environments”, joint with Dan Garber. MOR forthcoming.

The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks“, joint with Itai Arieli, Ron Peretz and Payton Young. Econometrica, 88, 569-594 (2020).

Identifiable Information Structures“, joint with Itai Arieli nad Rann Smorodinsky. GEB, 120, 16-27 (2020).

Incentive-Compatible Classification“, joint with Oren Dean and Moshe Tennenholtz. In AAAI ’20.

Private Bayesian Persuasion”, joint with Itai Arieli. JET, (2019) Forthcoming.

Naive Learning Through Probability Matching“, joint with Itai Arieli and Manuel Mueller-Frank. In EC ’19.

Robust Non-Bayesian Learning“, joint with Itai Arieli and Segev Shlomov. In EC ’19.

The Communication Complexity of Local Search“, joint with Shahar Dobzinski and Noan Nisan. In STOC ’19.

Robust Forecast Aggregtion“, joint with Itai Areili and Rann Smorodinsky. PNAS, (2018).

Incentive Compatible Diffusion“, joint with Oren Dean and Moshe Tennenholtz. In WWW ’18.

Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players“, joint with Itai Arieli. In EC’ 2017.

Forecast Aggregation”, joint with Itai Arieli and Rann Smorodinsky. In EC’ 2017.

Stable Secretaries“, joint with Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, and Rann Smorodinsky. Conference version: EC’ 2017. Journal version: Algorithmica (2019).

Communication Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria”, joint with Aviad Rubinstein. In STOC`2017. and in GEB Special Issue for best AGT papers from STOC/FOCS/SODA 2016-2017. Covered in press by the Quanta Magazine. Won the Prize in Game Theory and Computer Science in Honour of Ehud Kalai.

Best-Reply Dynamics in Large Aggregative Games”, MOR, 43 (2018), 333-346.

Computational Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion”, joint with Siddharth Barman. In ITCS’2017.

Random Extensive Form Games”, joint with Itai Arieli. JET, 166 (2016), 517-535.

Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy? PCP for PPAD and the Inapproximability of Nash“, joint with Christos Papadimitriou, and Aviad Rubinstein. In ITCS’2016.

Graphical Potential Games”, joint with Omer Tamuz. JET, 163 (2016), 889-899.

Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium”, joint with Siddharth Barman. TEAC 3.4 (2015): 22.

Query Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria”. 2014. Conerence version: In STOC’14. Journal version: JACM, 63.4 (2016): 36.

Empirical Distribution of Equilibrium Play and Its Testing Application”, joint with Siddharth Barman and Ron Peretz. Conference version: In EC’2014. Journal version: MOR (2016), forthcoming.

Hunter, Cauchy Rabbit, and Optimal Kakeya Sets”, joint with Yuval Peres, Ron Peretz, Perla Sousi, and Peter Winkler. Transtactions of AMS (2014), 366, 5567-5586.

How Long to Pareto Efficiency?”. IJGT, 43 (2014), 13-24.

Best-Reply Dynamics in Large Binary-Choice Anonymous Games”. GEB, 81 (2013), 130-144.

Average-Testing and Pareto Efficiency”, joint with Itai Arieli. JET, 147 (2012), 2376-2398.

Completely Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibria”. GEB, 76 (2012), 1-14.

Musical Chairs”, joint with Yehuda Afek, Uriel Feige, Eli Gafni, Nati Linial, and Benny Sudakov. Conference verion: DC’2011. Journal version: SIDMA 28.3 (2014), 1578-1600.

Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria”. IJGT, 39 (2010), 483-502.